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                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
              FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
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  MIRIAM MARTINEZ-SOLAIS, on behalf ) CASE NO. 1:15CV227
   of herself and all others
  similarly situated,
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            Plaintiff,
 6
            VS.
                                     ) Greensboro, North Carolina
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   VESUVIO'S II PIZZA & GRILL, INC., ) June 29, 2015
   and GIOVANNI SCOTTI D'ABBUSCO,
                                     ) 9:58 a.m.
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            Defendants.
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            TRANSCRIPT OF THE INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE L. PATRICK AULD
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                    UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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14 APPEARANCES:
15 For the Plaintiff: GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, ESQ.
                            315 S. Salem Street, Suite 310
16
                            Apex, North Carolina 27502
17
18 For the Defendants:
                           DENISE SMITH CLINE, ESQ.
                            16 North Boylan Avenue
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                            Raleigh, North Carolina 27603
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  Court Reporter:
                           BRIANA NESBIT, RPR
                            Official Court Reporter
22
                            P.O. Box 20991
                            Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27120
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        Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenotype reporter.
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         Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: All right. Next up we have 1:15CV227, Martinez-Solais versus D'Abbusco. I have listed Gilda Hernandez on behalf of the Plaintiff and Denise Smith Cline on 5 behalf of the Defendant. If you all would come forward. 6 MS. HERNANDEZ: Good morning, Your Honor, Gilda 7 Hernandez on behalf of the Plaintiff, Miriam Martinez-Solais, and with me is my paralegal, Sylvia Nelson, who is also here to take notes. 10 MS. CLINE: Good morning, Your Honor, Denise Cline 11 for the Defendants. 12 THE COURT: All right. This matter is on for an 13 initial pretrial conference. If you all would just bear with 14 me for just a moment. I believe each of the parties has filed 15 an individual report, and I have reviewed those. 16 Ms. Hernandez, would you summarize for me what you 17 suggest are the issues that are in dispute as it relates to the establishment of a scheduling order. I know there are some 18 19 other matters that perhaps we'll at least make reference to 20 later, but just focusing on the issue of the scheduling order 21 at this point.

THE COURT: If you would, stand up, please.

is -- in terms of the scheduling order, is that Plaintiffs feel

MS. HERNANDEZ: Well, Your Honor, the main difference

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that rather than --

MS. HERNANDEZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor, absolutely.

In terms of the scheduling order for the Plaintiff, it makes more sense to go ahead and brief the motion for conditional certification, which has already been filed, which is Docket 14, allowing the parties to go ahead and finish the briefing, which would already be done before the 45-day period as proposed by opposing counsel; and then, thereafter, if the Court determines that the motion for conditional certification and notice should be granted, at that point the notice would be sent to the Putative Plaintiffs in this case, giving them an opportunity to participate to opt into the action. And then once the opt-in period expires, then at that point it would be determined how many people are actual party plaintiffs in the action.

Right now, we have one Named Plaintiff and one Opt-In Plaintiff; and, therefore, at that point we'll know how many are total party plaintiffs, and then the parties will have 30 days to go ahead and potentially resolve the matter; and if the matter cannot be resolved, then the parties would go ahead and negotiate a second case management discovery plan that would affect the number of opt-in plaintiffs, subject to discovery and how many requests for interrogatories, production of documents, and so forth, Your Honor.

So that's really the only distinction between the two parties in terms of the case management plan.

THE COURT: And setting aside the issue of whether, in connection with conditional certification, the Defendants could have discovery on a -- some sort of equitable grounds to oppose certification, what about their right to have discovery about sort of the factual issues that might bear on conditional certification? Is there not some authority that there could be discovery about that issue, about whether there are commonalities that would warrant a collective action?

MS. HERNANDEZ: That's a very good question, Your Honor. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, you have an initial notice, and it's a very lenient standard. So if Your Honor were to determine that there should be some discovery that should be done prior to, you know, deciding on whether the motion for conditional certification should be granted, it should only apply to the actual individuals that have opted into the action and the Named Plaintiff, those two individuals only.

Yet, what Defendants' counsel is proposing, and it may be just a lack of understanding of how these actions operate -- Putative Plaintiffs are not part of the discovery process, and, yet, Defendant -- and this has been raised numerous times, Your Honor, which is why there was a subsequent motion for protective order that was filed on the 26th of June, because those are some serious accusations against Plaintiff's counsel personally, that somehow there have been improprieties

with respect to -- I'm sorry, improper solicitation with respect to Putative Plaintiffs with promises of pecuniary gain and promises of immigration services.

In the context of conditional certification, what you are looking at is simply are there putative plaintiffs that can potentially be similarly situated to the Named Plaintiff with respect to the common pay practice that's being alleged by the Named Plaintiff. The Named Plaintiff has alleged that not only she, but every other kitchen employee, was paid a nonfixed salary or hourly basis, was not paid properly the minimum wage and the overtime. We already have one Opt-In Plaintiff who has, you know, basically corroborated those allegations, and because there aren't that many -- we are not talking about 20, 30, 40. We are talking 10 to 15 employees. One additional opt-in plaintiff should be more than sufficient to meet the lenient standard for a motion for conditional certification be granted.

But again, Your Honor, the -- there are two important points here. One is that at this conjuncture, it would be very beneficial to allow the Putative Plaintiffs to receive accurate and timely notice of this action, where they are advised that they have nothing to fear with respect to retaliation because of the background of this case, Your Honor.

In this case -- this case was supposed to be filed in federal court on January 19, 2015, but during the interim, the

parties, not with this Defendants' counsel, but a former counsel -- the parties were actually engaged in settlement negotiations; and, yet, during the course of that time period, when Defendants' counsel specifically asked Plaintiff's counsel 5 to stand down, not file a complaint in federal court for two weeks, and no later than February 2, 2015, the Defendant had 7 the Plaintiff arrested, incarcerated. And it was -- it all led up to -- it began with threats of intimidation, coercion, threats that started with messages that were relayed to the 10 Plaintiff's sister-in-law, stating that if she did not drop 11 this action for unpaid wages, that she was going to be arrested 12 and potentially deported from this country and that he had 13 already hired a private investigator and had confirmed her 14 immigration status, and, thus, she had no rights under the Fair 15 Labor Standards Act to pursue in this action. So following all of those accusations and threats, I 16 17 immediately contacted the Defendant's wife and the Defendant and asked them to cease further threats as such threats were 18 19 illegal under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Section 15(a)(3), 20 and, yet, the threats continued; and then in the middle of 21 January of 2015, I was contacted by a former Defendants' 22 counsel, who, again, like I said, asked me to stand down, wait 23 for two weeks, and then Plaintiff was immediately arrested on

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January 28. Very, very serious circumstances, Your Honor.

And even after the arrest, the Opt-In Plaintiff was

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still working for the Defendant, and there was an investigation conducted by the United States Department of Labor with respect to retaliation complaints and was in the establishment conducting an investigation, and the Opt-In Plaintiff was instructed to lie to a government official about the pay practices and what have you.

So there is so much just horrible things that have happened to the Plaintiff and Opt-In Plaintiffs and Putative Plaintiffs, Your Honor, that at the outset of this litigation, it makes sense to potentially grant this motion for protective order so that it levels the playing field, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I guess my question, though, was whether or not there could be discovery that is relevant to the issue of conditional certification or not. What is your position on that?

MS. HERNANDEZ: As I said, Your Honor, if the Court determines that there should be some discovery prior to the briefing on the motion for conditional certification, which there is a plethora of authority that a motion for conditional certification can be determined on the basis of the Plaintiff's complaint and just a couple of declarations — but, you know, there are some courts that also believe there could be a little bit of precertification discovery, but if that's the way the Court is considering — or seriously considering that option, it should only be limited to the party Plaintiffs, and we are

talking about the Named Plaintiff and the Opt-In Plaintiff and not Putative Plaintiffs, especially to what, you know, the Defendants' counsel has already suggested are going to be nothing more than declarations to somehow, you know, accuse Plaintiff's counsel of engaging in improper solicitation.

THE COURT: Setting that aside, what about issues about whether or not there really was a common pay practice or not? Why wouldn't they be entitled to due discovery of other employees to find out whether or not those other employees said there was a common pay practice?

MS. HERNANDEZ: That's a good question, and these actions — as long as there is some suggestion that there may be, okay, that there may be putative plaintiffs that were subject to the same kind of policy of unpaid overtime and minimum wage, that should suffice, but, again, with — if there is going to be the precertification discovery, it would be just on the basis of the Plaintiff and the Opt—In Plaintiff to determine whether or not they — the Opt—In Plaintiff was subject to the same pay policies that the Plaintiff has alleged in her complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Cline, I will let you put anything you want on the record. I guess, first, I would want to know, though, do you have any authority for the idea that there should be discovery about these kind of equitable defenses to certification that you described? I have not been

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able to locate any.
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             MS. CLINE: Your Honor, there are some cases
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   involving class certification in which the parties have been
   permitted to discover and object to the class certification
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   process because of equitable conduct and recruitment and other
   misconduct.
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             THE COURT: So discovery at the conditional
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   certification stage about these kind of equitable matters?
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             MS. CLINE: Well, Your Honor, the -- there's been --
   there are cases about class certification and the challenge to
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   class certification based on the conduct of counsel and other
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   improper recruitment.
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             THE COURT: What about in the context of a collective
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   action?
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             MS. CLINE: I don't have any authority on that point.
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             THE COURT: All right. And aren't the standards a
   little bit different?
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             MS. CLINE: Yes, they are, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. And then if I was to find
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   that, for purposes of conditional certification, it would be
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   premature to engage in that sort of discovery that you
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   described, is there other discovery that you would want to do
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   pertaining to conditional certification?
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             MS. CLINE: Yes, Your Honor. We have made -- as I
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   agree with Ms. Hernandez, I made very serious allegations based
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on a good-faith belief that I have now gotten further due diligence on. We believe that the allegations we've made about recruitment of the potential Opt-In Putative Plaintiffs is very serious and goes to the integrity of this entire action of, 5 certainly, my clients' defense; but, as my affirmative defense and our responses indicated, we believe that counsel and Plaintiff have engaged in oral solicitations of Putative Plaintiffs involving the payment of cash and the offer of immigration services in exchange for participation in this 10 collective action. 11 THE COURT: Right, but my question was -- putting 12 that aside, if I was to decide that at the conditional 13 certification stage, we are not going to have discovery into 14 those kind of equitable defenses, my question was is there 15 separate -- any separate kind of discovery that you would want to do that pertains to the conditional certification issue? 16 17 MS. CLINE: Yes, Your Honor. I would certainly want 18 to depose and speak to the Plaintiff and Opt-In Plaintiff about 19 their contentions about the similarity of their positions and other criteria for collective action certification. 20 21 THE COURT: All right. And how long would you want to do that? 22 23 MS. CLINE: Well, Your Honor, Ms. Hernandez and I 24 have sort of cross reports. The initial report that

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Ms. Hernandez shared with me contemplated that she would file

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her motion for certification within 45 days after the
   scheduling order of this Court; and based on that
   understanding, Your Honor, I had suggested 45 days for the
   initial equitable discovery. Now that she has already filed
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   her motion for conditional certification, Your Honor, I think I
   would need at least 60 days to conduct any kind of
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   precertification discovery.
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             THE COURT: And even if that was limited only to sort
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   of factual issues that pertained to the conditional
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   certification determination and not include any of these
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   equitable defenses that you have proffered?
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             MS. CLINE: Yes, Your Honor, I mean, I would seek 60
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   days.
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             THE COURT:
                         And then you would want to file your
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   response to the motion for conditional certification after that
   60-day period?
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             MS. CLINE: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         All right. Do you -- are there any other
   issues relevant to establishment of the scheduling order or the
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   proper way forward that you wanted to address at this point?
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             MS. CLINE: Other than what we have already, you
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   know, argued, Your Honor. I do seek discovery on the equitable
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   issues.
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             THE COURT: I understand that; but separate and apart
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   from that, are there any other differences in the planning for
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a schedule that we should discuss at this time? 2 MS. CLINE: I am not aware of any, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Hernandez, anything further you want to say? 5 MS. HERNANDEZ: Well, Your Honor, as -- I just want 6 to clarify a couple of points. 7 If the Court is going to permit some sort of limited precertification discovery with respect to the opt-in putative -- I'm sorry -- with respect to the Opt-In and Named 10 Plaintiff, that there should also be, at the very outset, some 11 sort of limitation in terms of addressing Plaintiff's motion for protective order because, again, of the retaliatory conduct 13 that has been already done to the Named Plaintiff in this 14 action and, you know, given that the federal U.S. Department of 15 Labor has, you know, conducted an investigation. The findings of that investigation still have not been released, but there 16 have also been -- immediately after the Plaintiff was arrested, 17 18 there was an application or a request for certification of a U 19 visa that was also made upon the U.S. Department of Labor, and 20 that sort of -- just give me a minute, Your Honor. 21 So the Wage and Hour Division has the authority to 22 certify applications for U nonimmigrant visas pursuant to the 23 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. 24 The Wage and Hour Division did, in fact, certify the U visa on 25 the basis that the victim, Plaintiff Martinez, is likely to be

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helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying
   criminal activity of which she has been a victim. One would be
   witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(b)(1) and, two,
   extortion under North Carolina General Statute, Section
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   14-118.4. And Plaintiff's U visa was approved on February 11,
   2015.
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             Again, very, very, serious issues going on in this
   case, Your Honor, and to the extent that there can be some
   limitations in terms of the communications, threats, coercion
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             THE COURT: But it sounds like, from what you are
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   saying, she has legal status?
             MS. HERNANDEZ: She has correctly -- I'm sorry --
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   correct. She has temporary legal status because the U visa has
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   already been certified, but it hasn't been entirely completed.
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   There is, like, a two-year waiting list before ICE will
   actually give her the final permanent residency.
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             THE COURT: Right, but she is not subject to removal
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   at this point?
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             MS. HERNANDEZ: She is not, but the concern is not
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   just about her anymore, Your Honor. It is about the Putative
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   Plaintiffs that are similarly situated because the Putative
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   Plaintiffs that worked with her in the kitchen have immigration
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   issues.
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             In fact, as you can see from the Defendants' answer,
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the 26(f) report, these constant accusations that Plaintiff's
   counsel has made promises of pecuniary gain, which is
   ridiculous because this case is about people that haven't been
   paid their wages, overtime and minimum wage. And then,
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   secondly, the issue of immigration services, it's because the
   Defendant understands he was hiring, to his advantage,
   undocumented individuals to pay them very low wages and then,
   simultaneously, when they were trying to exercise their rights,
   using that very same advantage against them offensively, Your
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   Honor, or defensively, if you will.
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             THE COURT: I understand. My point was that if we
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   have a limited discovery prior to conditional certification, it
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   would appear that it would be directed at the Named Plaintiff
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   and one Opt-In Plaintiff, and then the Named Plaintiff now has
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   protection against removal and so presumably understands that
   she's not subject to deportation.
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             What about the -- what is the situation with the
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   Opt-In Plaintiff?
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             MS. HERNANDEZ: With the Opt-In Plaintiff, Your
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   Honor -- and that's actually an excellent, excellent question
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   because during the course of the Department of Labor's
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   determination of granting the U visa certification, it is their
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   responsibility to investigate the circumstances and to
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   interview other putative plaintiffs to determine what their
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   circumstances were. In addition to the Department of Labor's
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investigation of retaliation, they will interview other putative plaintiffs; and I think that's where the Defendant is distorting all of these facts to accuse me of somehow engaging in this improper solicitation.

But to answer your question, Your Honor, the U.S.

Department of Labor is considering a U visa for other Putative

Plaintiffs and the Opt-In Plaintiff, Mr. Alvarado, but I think

what I am referring to is, okay, we have the protection for the

Named Plaintiff. The Opt-In Plaintiff is still not entirely

protected. Then you have the Putative Plaintiffs. The

potential threat and coercion against those individuals, any

sort of language that indicates look what happened to her, and

if you think about getting involved, the same thing will happen

to you, when they have not been given any protection at this

point from the Department of Labor.

THE COURT: Well, obviously, you filed your motion, and your motion will be addressed. I don't know whether it's going to be referred to me to be addressed or not at this point.

In terms of fashioning any kind of order as it relates to discovery regarding the conditional certification issue, it seems like that at this point the Named Plaintiff at least has protection from those kinds of concerns, but -- so at this point, I don't know really if I am going to have a role in addressing the emergency motion that you filed or not. I mean,

it's styled as a protective order, but it is really not a

discovery type of protective order. It is something different

from that, at least in most of its respects. So I will -- if

it's referred to me, then I will address it.

It does strike me, Ms. Cline, that it may be

appropriate to shorten the response time on that motion. What do you say about that?

MS. CLINE: Well, Your Honor, you know, I want to address -- first of all, I just want to state for the record that I disagree with almost everything Ms. Hernandez has said about the facts, but leaving that aside, you know, we have very -- I mean, I'm -- Ms. Hernandez's motion was filed Friday night. I was out of town and had not even reviewed that with my client until yesterday. I would certainly seek the full time, Your Honor, because the motion is very extensive. There are a number of declarants, and I would seek the full time in response.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I am going to take a look at that and determine whether or not the time should be shortened on that motion. I also will take a look at the case law about discovery regarding conditional certification, and I will enter an order as quickly as I can.

Anything further you want to say, Ms. Hernandez?

MS. HERNANDEZ: No, Your Honor, other than -- yes, I mean, there is a plethora of authority supporting the motion

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for conditional certification, and the fact that the Plaintiff
  has already filed it, it makes beautiful sense to go ahead and
   start briefing that. And then also the motion for protective
   order, again given the severity of the circumstances and the
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   very unique issues here, if that could be briefed on an
   expedited basis, that would also be wonderful, and it would
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   protect the Putative Plaintiffs as well as the Opt-In
   Plaintiff, Your Honor. Thank you so much.
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             THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Ms. Cline?
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             MS. CLINE:
                        No, Your Honor. I would simply suggest
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   that -- I agree with Ms. Hernandez that there is certainly case
   law that suggests that this stage be a lenient one. This is
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   not your usual case, and I cannot imagine that -- I would
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   certainly contend that the standards are not this lenient in
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   this kind of case.
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             THE COURT: All right. I will take a further look at
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   that and try to get an order out as quickly as I can.
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         (END OF PROCEEDINGS AT 10:23 A.M.)
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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
3	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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6	I, Briana L. Nesbit, Official Court Reporter,
7	certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct
8	transcript of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
9	
10	Dated this 13th day of July 2015.
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12	Briana L. Nesbit
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14	Briana L. Nesbit, RPR Official Court Reporter
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